The phenomenology of ordinary perceptual experiences reveals a close tie between attention and visual consciousness. Mainly speaking, if we attend to something, we are conscious of it, and if we are conscious of something, we can direct our attention towards its particulars. But what exactly is the nature of the relationship? Is attention a necessary or sufficient condition for consciousness? Ordinary experiences alone cannot answer the question. To reach a compelling answer, philosophical reflections and empirical evidence should be merged. Adopting this approach, the paper claims that attention is not a necessary or sufficient condition for visual consciousness. To prove the claim, we just need to demonstrate that there is a case of awareness without attention and a case of attention without awareness.  For awareness without attention, identity crowding, and certain cases of ordinary experiences, and for attention without attention, some instances of blindsight and Jiang’s experiment are referred to. Furthermore, as a supplementary move, opposing viewpoints are introduced. In order to defend the main claim, the views are criticized.

Knowledge in Sadra’ philosophy, is merely presence of something near Percipient. The most perfect sense of “ presence” under this school, is intuitive knowledge of human being about “ self” within which knowing and known have unity. Hence, From Sadra’ s view, “ knowledge” of “ self” has a very high rank position in philosophy. However, what is described as " intuitive knowledge to self" in transcendental wisdom, From Kant’ s view is not intuitive knowledge; but this knowledge is also a kind of our empirical knowledge where is obtained through mediation of “ subjective form” which is called “ appearance” by Kant. But Kant believes that other than this “ empirical ego” assigned to “ transcendental ego” He believes that it cannot, as Nomenon, be placed in the center of the human experiential vision. Therefor, he neither believes knowledge of self as an acquired knowledge nor as intuitive one. In this article, we explains this problem of why Mulla Sadra considers intuitive cognition of self. This problem is embedded within a more general problem: Whether that ego which comprehends itself belongs to knowledge? In this paper, we will show that the “ knowledge” of “ self” , unlike Kant's conception, cannot be explained except by the existential attitude, because intuitive perception is a kind of presence in existence and for existence.

Even though contemporary approaches have dwindled the class consciousness and class identity, but at the same time, they magnify the gender and its political aspects. The growth of women's consciousness and redefinition of gender identity is partly due to their social participation in public sphere and partly due to women's movements. Despite common belief, even those women who do not believe in women's movements, they show an active gender identity because of the high level of awareness provided by mass media and other sources. Some factors such as structural, demographical, women's experiences, ideological tendencies and attitude are the most responsible in shaping gender consciousness. A along with other factors ideological prejudgments, life conditions in childhood and adulthood, cultural and gender socialization, access to some resources such as education for women, women's authority in the family and society are considered to be the most important factors affecting gender identity and consciousness. Despite the fact that social attentiveness toward gender inequality has grown remarkably, but the reaction of the public, especially women is still uncertain. For instance, it is not clear how Iranian women with different background evaluate their position in the family and social hierarchy. This article tires to present a theoretical model and identify those factors which can affect the gender consciousness.      

The crucial problem of self-consciousness is how to account for knowing self-reference without launching into a regress or without presupposing self-consciousness rather than accounting for it (circle). In the literature we find two bottom-up proposals for solving the traditional problem: the postulation of nonconceptual forms of self-consciousness and the postulation of a pre-reflexive form of self-consciousness. However, none of them seems satisfactory for several reasons. In contrast, I believe that the only way of solving this traditional puzzle is to assume another bottom-up approach, namely the one that accepts Baker’ s challenge to naturalism and provides a naturalist framework for self-consciousness; in Baker’ s terms, to account for self-consciousness in non-intentional, non-semantic, and nonmental terms. That is the aim of this paper. My thesis rests on two claims. The first is the metaphysical claim that every creature enjoys a fundamental relation to itself, namely identity. The second is Dretske’ s epistemological claim that representations do not require a Self, traditionally understood as the principle that spontaneously organizes mental activity and lies behind all intentional acts. Briefly, I argue for a naturalization of self-consciousness that postulates nonlinguistic, naturalized, and selfless form of representation of the cognitive system based on the metaphysical, fundamental relation everyone has to himself, namely identity. Selfconsciousness emerges when brain states are selflessly recruited through learning to represent the cognitive system itself as a subject.

Husserl, corresponding to three levels of temporality, introduces three levels of time-consciousness in his works. These three levels of time-consciousness are the consciousness of the temporality of transcendent objects (objective time), the consciousness of the temporality of intentional acts and experiences (subjective time), and finally, the deepest level is what he calls consciousness of inner time or absolute consciousness. This third level is the continuous stream or flow of consciousness which in its streaming constitutes itself and other levels of temporality. Although this constituting flow is the deepest foundation of temporality, it is not temporal in the ordinary meaning of the term. That means despite being self-constituting and self-temporalizing it is not given in a higher level of time. Understanding the true meaning of this level of temporality, for long, has been a challenge for scholars. One of the attempts to interpret and demystify this layer of temporality is based on making a connection between this absolute flow of consciousness and a kind of implicit and minimal self-consciousness usually called pre-reflective self-consciousness. In this article besides explaining the three levels of temporality and time-consciousness, I have analyzed this view about the relationship between the third level of time-consciousness and pre-reflective self-consciousness and compared the ideas of scholars on the matter.

Moore’ s sentences are sentences of the form “ p but I don't believe that p” or “ p but I believe that not-p” . These sentences might be true, yet they are ‘ absurd’ to believe or assert. According to some version of Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness such as Higher-Order Thought Theory (HOT), it is claimed that conscious beliefs in Moorean sentences is not possible. Namely, one will become irrational with their conscious beliefs in their set of beliefs. In this paper we will first introduce Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness and will show that How they work. we will then argue that there are at least four criticisms against approaches based on Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness in relation of Moore's Paradox and thus are not tenable. Key words: Moore's paradox, epistemic paradox, rationality, Consciousness, Higher-Order Thought Theory